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INTRODUCTION
It is past time to rethink America’s criminal justice system. The
deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and countless others, and the
events that took place in Ferguson, Missouri, have exposed a system
in which poor people and people of color suffer repeated interactions
with the police that are disrespectful, unwarranted, and sometimes
violent. These same individuals are disproportionately charged and
prosecuted and routinely face excessive fines and penalties. At best,
this so-called criminal justice system is unjust; at worst it is both
shameful and scandalous.
These police interactions are not accidental, however, but the
product of a deliberate strategy by government officials. Many
municipalities have chosen to use the criminal justice system as a
revenue-extracting tool. Offenses, even minor ones, produce fines and
court fees that are used to fund municipal government removing the
need to raise the taxes of those who might object to paying. 1 In many
* Glenn H. Reynolds is a Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law
at the University of Tennessee College of Law. Penny J. White is an Elvin E. Overton
Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Advocacy and Dispute
Resolution at the University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. See CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, HARVARD L. SCH., CONFRONTING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
DEBT,
A
GUIDE
FOR
POLICY
REFORM
12
(2016),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/criminal-justice/confronting-criminal-justice-debt-
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cases, as in the Ferguson, Missouri example we discuss below, this
revenue-generation strategy becomes the chief driver of a
government’s criminal justice priorities.
The result is an interaction between law enforcement and citizens
that appears essentially predatory: Officers are tasked with finding
(or generating) violations and issuing citations, after which courts and
clerks assess a seemingly endless array of fees, fines and costs whose
chief purpose is the fattening of government coffers.2 Meanwhile
citizens are jailed, arrested, and bankrupted. They lose jobs, licenses,
opportunities, and liberty.
This was the dire situation that Tianja Lanxter faced when she
came to our law school’s legal clinic. As a result of life-long abuse and
addiction issues, Ti (the name she prefers), had served a prison
sentence in the Tennessee Prison for Women for a crime committed
years earlier. In 2013, she was released on parole and determined to
change the direction of her life. Ti entered the Magdalene Program, a
residential recovery program for women who have survived lives of
violence and addiction.3 In addition to the community of support,
Magdalene participants receive educational support, job training,
addiction counseling, and a pathway to productive lives free from
addiction and criminal activity.4 At Magdalene, Ti excelled,
completing her GED, graduating from Magdalene, and then going to
work for Thistle Farms, the nonprofit business whose healing
products are made and marketed by the residents of Magdalene. At
Thistle Farms, again, Ti excelled, becoming a manager and traveling
around the country to promote the recovery program and to tell her
personal story of recovery. On her modest salary, Ti bought a used
car, rented an apartment, and secured car, rental, and health
insurance, while regularly paying all parole fees owed.
What brought Ti to the UT Legal Clinic was a letter from the court
clerk of the Knox County General Sessions Court informing Ti that
the court intended to pursue Ti for unpaid court costs, jail fees, and
3.pdf; Larry Schwartztol, The Role of Courts in Eliminating the Racial Impact of
Criminal Justice Debt, in THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS’ 2017 REPORT ON
TRENDS IN STATE COURTS: FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES
15–16
(Deborah
W.
Smith
et
al.
eds.,
2017),
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/ digital/collection/accessfair/id/784.
2. See CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 11–14; Schwartztol, supra
note 1, at 15–16.
3. See Melinda Clark, Magdalene and Thistle Farms Offer Prostitutes a Chance
for Regrowth, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2011, 9:31 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/magdalene-and-thistle-farms_n_854130.
4. See id.
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fines, imposed for low-level traffic offenses, dating from 1998–2008.
The total amount owed was less than $3,200, but out of reach given
Ti’s income and financial obligations. The problem Ti faced was much
more than the taint of indebtedness, it was the loss of all she had
worked to achieve. Because Tennessee suspended the driving
privileges of those with unpaid court costs, even if Ti was able to avoid
being jailed for failure to pay the amounts, she faced the very real
possibility of losing her car, her job, and her home.5
Ti’s story is real but not at all unique. Thousands of individuals
have suffered a loss of liberty and opportunity by virtue of draconian
laws that ultimately punish people for their poverty.6
Worse yet, judicial supervision in these cases is essentially
missing in action, as the courts are not umpires, but rather
participants, in this process, benefiting from the revenues that the
system extracts. Instead of controlling the system, the courts are
compromised by it. Moreover, the system is not racially neutral. A
common factor in cities that rely on hefty fines, fees, and court costs
as a mechanism of funding the courts is a large African-American
population.7 What the Justice Department found to be true in
Ferguson, Missouri,8 is true throughout the country. “Among the fifty
cities with the highest proportion of revenues from fines, the median
size of African American population—on a percentage basis—is more
than five times greater than the national median.”9 The
disproportionate concentration in communities of color results not
only in an increase in incarceration rates for African Americans but
also in a community-wide increase in the racial wealth gap.10 The
impact of this increase in the racial wealth gap often persists long
after the citizen’s encounter with the police has ended.11
5. All court documents from the State v. Lanxter case in which we asked the
court to forgive Ti’s costs and fees are on file in the author’s office and with the General
Sessions Court for Knox County, Tennessee.
6. See CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 11–14.
7. See id. at 14.
8. The Ferguson report found that African-Americans were more likely than
Whites to be stopped, more likely to be issued multiple citations, and more likely to be
cited when the officer had discretion. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 64–69 (2015) [hereinafter DOJ REPORT],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2015/03/04/ferguson_findings_34-15.pdf; see also Consent Decree, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv000180-CDP (E.D. Mo., Mar. 17, 2016).
9. Dan Kopf, The Fining of Black America, PRICEONOMICS (June 24, 2016),
https://priceonomics.com/the-fining-of-black-america/.
10. See Schwartztol, supra note 1, at 14.
11. See id. at 14, 17.
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The current system of fee-based criminal justice as it prevails in
many communities is both unfair and discriminatory. It is also
unconstitutional. That is a strong charge, but it is also true. It also
calls for strong measures in response, which we discuss below.
We begin this analysis from vastly different places. As people,
lawyers, and law professors, we hold very different views about most
of the important issues of the day. Our backgrounds are dissimilar, as
are many of our values, interests, and areas of expertise. Yet, after
starting at altogether different places, in the end, we are joined in
conclusions and solutions and imagine that others, despite their
varying points of view, may agree. Based on Supreme Court caselaw
on judicial independence, along with two very recent cases from the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, we conclude that a judicial
system that depends on revenue extracted from its “users”—criminal
defendants, victims of civil forfeiture, and the like—violates due
process of law because it is insufficiently independent and unbiased.
We also offer a number of solutions that can be applied by both courts
and legislatures.
I. THE LEGAL SYSTEM’S DEPENDENCE ON REVENUE FROM FINES, FEES
AND FORFEITURES
A. Ferguson, Missouri, an Exemplar of a Conflict-Ridden System
Shortly after Michael Brown was killed in Ferguson, Missouri, on
August 9, 2014, by Ferguson, Missouri police officer Darren Wilson,
the United States Department of Justice began an investigation of the
practices of the Ferguson Police Department.12 That investigation
would uncover and reveal a host of unconstitutional practices by
elected officials, local law enforcement, and the municipal court. The
Justice Department’s investigation included weeks of data collection
and analysis, records review, interviews, and observations, and
resulted in a blistering report implicating the Ferguson Police
Department as well as the Ferguson Municipal Court.13 The
Department of Justice concluded that the policies and practices
disproportionately impacted Ferguson’s African-American residents
and “reflect[ed] and exacerbate[ed] existing racial bias.”14 Moreover,
the policies and practices that were discovered were not grounded in

12.
13.
14.

See DOJ REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
See id.
Id. at 2.
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a legitimate desire to protect the community.15 Rather, they were
“shaped by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by public safety
needs” and resulted from “discriminatory intent”16
Elected officials in Ferguson depended upon the Ferguson Police
Department and Municipal Court primarily to produce revenue for
city operations. The revenue that was generated by police issuing
citations and the court imposing fines and court costs accounted for
almost 10% of the city’s budget in 2010.17 But, beginning in 2011, the
city steadily increased the amount of revenue it expected the police
and the court to generate and the police and the court system
consistently met or exceeded those expectations.18 By 2015, the fines
and costs revenue accounted for almost 25% of the city’s budget.19
Ferguson’s elected officials relied on more than the subtle
implications of the annual budget to communicate their expectations.
They directly communicated their expectations to the Chief of Police,
who in turn prodded officers to write more citations.20 When revenues
from sales tax collections fell short, the Chief Finance Director asked
the police chief if the department could “deliver [a] 10% increase.”21
In order to do so, the Chief asked for more officers and, around 2010,
instituted a change in shift schedules that enabled more officers to
generate more tickets per shift.22 From the change in shift schedules
in 2010, until the year of Michael Brown’s death, officers in
Ferguson—a town of 21,000 residents—issued 90,000 citations and
summonses for municipal code violations, averaging more than one
citation per resident per year.23 By 2013–2014, the number of
citations issued increased by 50%.24
The expectation that the Ferguson Police Department would raise
15. See id. at 13.
16. Id. at 2.
17. Id. at 9.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 10.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 13.
22. See id. at 10. In 2014, the City’s budget documents noted that since the shift
change took effect “the percent of [police] resources allocated to traffic enforcement has
increased,” and “[a]s a result, traffic enforcement related collections increased.” Id. An
additional increase was noted in 2015, also attributed to the increased dedication of
resources to traffic enforcement. Id.
23. Id. at 7.
24. Id. The investigation determined that the increase in citations was not
attributable to an increase in crime by looking at the nature of citations and
determining that the number of citations issued for the more serious infractions
remained constant. Id. at 7 n.7.
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revenues for the city was well known to the individual police officers.
Not only did the Chief of Police regularly transmit the information to
officers, the department routinely ranked officers in terms of citations
written.25 Lists including the officer’s names and the number of
tickets issued each month were posted in the department; those who
wrote the most tickets were praised as being the most “productive,”
while those at the bottom of the list were chided, reassigned,
evaluated poorly, or disciplined for their lack of productivity.26
Officers could, and frequently did, increase their productivity, by
exercising their discretion to issue multiple citations during each
citizen encounter.27 Thus, for example, an officer who charged an
individual with driving under the influence of an intoxicant would
also cite the driver for any number of minor traffic infractions that
came to light—speeding, failure to remain in lane, littering, no
insurance, no seat belt, and others. Similarly, when an officer stopped
an individual for walking on the street, rather than on the sidewalk,
the officer could issue three citations—one for manner of walking, one
for failure to comply, and one for impeding traffic. In 2013, for
example, approximately 9,000 warrants were issued for over 32,000
offenses, thus indicating an average of more than three citations per
warrant.28
This policy of overcharging was encouraged by the prosecution,
who counseled officers to issue “all necessary summonses . . . for each
incident.”29 The prosecution’s justification for this policy was “to
ensure that a proper resolution to all cases is being achieved and that
the court is maintaining the correct volume for offenses occurring
within the city.”30 The “correct volume” formula was a proxy for
accomplishing the city’s revenue expectations from fines and costs. In
addition to coaching officers on how to add additional charges, the
prosecution also rigorously prosecuted even the most trivial of
25. See id. at 11–12.
26. Id. In internal police memoranda, supervising officers were encouraged to
assign officers who weren’t producing to “prisoner pick up and bank runs.” Id. at 12.
Performance evaluation criteria included a category for “[i]ncrease/consistent in
productivity, the ability to maintain an average ticket [sic] of 28 per month.” Id.
27. See id. at 4. The investigation showed that officers exercised their discretion
more harshly against African-American individuals than white individuals. Id. at 63.
While 67% of Ferguson citizens are African-American, the investigation showed that
95% of the citations for manner of walking and 94% of the failure to comply citations—
both trivial offenses that could easily have been disregarded—were issued against
African Americans. Id. at 67.
28. See id. at 55.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Id.
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offenses, virtually eliminated dismissals, regularly opposed
alternative sentences, and routinely requested the higher fines in the
range.31
From all indications, the officers not only increased their
productivity, they also helped the prosecution’s office assure the
correct volume of offenses. According to findings of the Department of
Justice, in 2014, at the end of the year, 24,000 traffic cases and 28,000
non-traffic cases were pending in the Ferguson Municipal Court; less
than five years later, those numbers basically doubled, rising to
53,000 traffic cases and 50,000 non-traffic cases pending.
But neither the prosecution’s zeal to maintain the correct volume
of cases32 nor the officers’ sustained productivity could accomplish the
revenue result desired by the city officials without the cooperation of
the city’s judicial system. The city’s judicial system, the Ferguson
Municipal Court, was organized as “a part of the police department.”33
The court staff included a municipal judge, who is elected by the city
council and subject to reappointment every two years,34 and a clerk
and assistant clerks, who were supervised by the chief of police.35
The court’s key role in revenue production was not left to chance.
As they did with the police chief, city officials made it clear to the
judge that “revenue generation” was a priority for court operations.36
The amount of revenue that the judge produced through fines and
costs was a key factor that the city council considered in determining
31. See id. at 10–11, 69.
32. The prosecutor is also appointed by the City Council and serves also as City
Attorney. See id. at 8.
33. Id. (“Ferguson’s municipal court operates as part of the police department.
The court is supervised by the Ferguson Chief of Police, is considered part of the police
department for City organizational purposes, and is physically located within the
police station. Court staff report directly to the Chief of Police.”).
34. See id. at 11.
35. See id. at 8.
[T]he Court Clerk, who is employed under the Police Chief’s
supervision, plays the most significant role in managing the court
and exercises broad discretion in conducting the court’s daily
operations. Ferguson’s municipal code confers broad authority on
the Court Clerk, including the authority to collect all fines and fees,
accept guilty pleas, sign and issue subpoenas, and approve bond
determinations. Ferguson Mun. Code § 13-7. Indeed, the Court
Clerk and assistant clerks routinely perform duties that are, for all
practical purposes, judicial.
Id.
36.

Id. at 14.
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whether to reappoint the judge.37 To inform the council’s
reappointment decision, the municipal court judge at the time of
Michael Brown’s killing, Judge Brockmeyer, reported to the council
that he had created additional fees for failure to appear and increased
fines for repeat offenders’ subsequent violations, which could not have
happened “without the cooperation of the Court Clerk, the Chief of
Police, and the Prosecutor’s Office.”38 In addition to applauding the
judge’s creation of new fees and imposition of higher fines,39 the city
leaders praised the judge for “significantly increasing court collections
over the years.”40
The primary method that the court used to increase collections
was the threat that an arrest warrant would be issued leading to the
arrest of those who failed to pay.41 Whether to issue an arrest warrant
was not determined by the nature of the underlying infraction. Nor
was it motivated by public safety concerns. Rather, the “primary role
of the warrant” was to “facilitate fine collection,” in effect making the
Police Department the “collection agency for [the] municipal court.”42
Just as the municipal court accommodated the police department
by imposing multiple sanctions for citations arising out of the same
conduct and rarely allowing alternative sentences such as community
service or probation, the police department accommodated the court
by serving a “staggering” number of arrest warrants issued for the
nonpayment of fines and costs.43 The year that Michael Brown was
killed, over 16,000 arrest warrants for nonpayment of fines, fees, and
costs were outstanding, awaiting service on the indebted individual,
37. When it came time to reappoint Judge Brockmeyer, a councilmember opposed
the reappointment due to the judge’s harsh and impatient courtroom demeanor. Id. at
15. While the member noted that “switching judges would/could lead to loss of
revenue,” he argued that it would be worth the loss because it is “important that cases
are being handled properly and fairly.” Id. In response, the city mayor favored the
judge’s reappointment because “[i]t goes without saying the City cannot afford to lose
any efficiency in our Courts, nor experience any decrease in our Fines and Forfeitures.”
Id.
38. Id. at 14.
39. See id. at 10. In comparison to similar municipalities, Ferguson’s fines were
at the top of the list, with fines for discretionary offenses being many times higher
than those in similar municipalities. Id. at 50, 52, 63. An example illustrates the
starkness of the comparison. By fining individuals who could not provide proof that
they were insured $375, rather than the median amount charged by most jurisdictions
$175 charged by most offenses, Ferguson raised almost $300,000 in 2013. Id. at 52–
53.
40. Id. at 14.
41. Id. at 55.
42. Id. at 55–56.
43. Id. at 44, 55.
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who would then be brought to court and required to either make bond
or remain jailed until fines and costs were paid.44 As found by the
DOJ, the Ferguson Municipal Court used “arrest warrants and the
threat of arrest as its primary tool for collecting outstanding fines for
municipal code violations.”45
The issuance of an arrest warrant for those who missed court
appearances or failed to make a payment pursuant to a payment plan
was not based on the severity of their original infraction.
Despite the fact that the police department would not have
arrested (and, for many infractions, could not have arrested) the
individual for the original infraction, the court routinely issued arrest
warrants for those individuals who failed to appear or failed to pay
without any inquiry into potential justifications.46 Additionally, for
those who missed a court appearance, the judge created a new fine,
which increased with each failure to appear.47
Some Ferguson citizens who faced arrest for failure to appear or
pay would manage to post a bond and acquire release, but the city’s
bond practices were inconsistently applied and misunderstood. The
amount of bail set for a particular individual seemed to be geared
toward the amount of money the individual owed, but if the bond was
forfeited—which would occur if the individual failed to appear—the
amount deposited was contributed to the city coffers and not applied
against the debt.48 The Ferguson Municipal Court benefitted when
higher bonds were set because, if those bonds were forfeited, more
money went into the city treasury.49
The increase in citations and the frequent use of arrest warrants
to jail those who had missed a court appearance or a payment resulted
in a huge backlog of cases in the Ferguson Municipal Court. In the
three or four court sessions held each month, it was not unusual for
the court’s docket for each session to include 1200–1500 cases, though
44. Id. at 55.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 42–47. Ironically, though hundreds of individuals were jailed in
Ferguson for failure to appear or failure to pay, the municipal court judge told the
Department of Justice that in his 11 years on the bench, he remembered only once
sentencing an individual to jail for a violation of the municipal code. Id. at 8–9.
47. Id. at 42.
48. See id. at 61.
49. See id. A similar mechanism was at work in New Orleans where a Judicial
Expense Fund (JEF) dependent on revenues collected from fines, fees, and a
percentage of bail bonds was administered by New Orleans judges and used to
supplement a wide range of employment benefits for judges. The system was the
subject of litigation in Cain v. White. Cain v. White, 937 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 2019); see
discussion infra notes 93–104.
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on occasion that number would reach 2000.50 From the perspective of
the city council, these docket sizes were essential to produce the
increased revenue from fines and costs on which the city depended.
When these burgeoning caseloads indicated a need for more court
staff, the council noted that the costs of adding staff would be “more
than covered by the increase in revenues.”51 But from the perspective
of the individual whose case was on the docket, these unwieldy
dockets often meant multiple court appearances and days off work
(when the court failed to conclude the docket and continued the case);
a serious disincentive to challenge the allegations; and a keen
motivation to agree to pay whatever fine the prosecution requested.
Reviewing the fines and fees structure, the use of arrest warrants,
the bond system, the animosity toward those who wished to challenge
their citations, and the structure in place to thwart any effort to
resolve cases fairly and timely, the Justice Department rendered a
blistering assessment of the Ferguson municipal court system.
Ferguson has allowed its focus on revenue generation
to fundamentally compromise the role of Ferguson’s
municipal court. The municipal court does not act as a
neutral arbiter of the law or a check on unlawful police
conduct. Instead, the court primarily uses its judicial
authority as the means to compel the payment of fines
and fees that advance the City’s financial interests.
This has led to court practices that violate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal
protection requirements. The court’s practices also
impose unnecessary harm, overwhelmingly on AfricanAmerican individuals, and run counter to public
safety.52
1. Before and After Ferguson
While the Ferguson Report was uniquely detailed and candid, the
phenomena it detailed were neither unexpected, nor novel or random.
They were not unexpected because, in the twenty-five years leading
up to Michael Brown’s death, the dramatic increase in criminal justice
expenditures had required a similar increase in criminal justice
funding. Because of the steady rise in the prison population—from
50.
51.
52.

DOJ REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
Id.
Id. at 3.
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200,00 in 1972 to more than 2 million today—states found their
budgets stretched.53 A 2015 study by the Council of Economic
Advisors documented a 74% growth in criminal justice expenditures
in the twenty-year period beginning in 1993 and ending in 2012.54
The dramatic increase of expenditures led state and local
governments to search for funding sources. Rather than raise taxes,
governments sought alternative methods of raising revenue. Some
argued that those brought into the system, as its “users” were
responsible for the increased expenditures, ignoring the criminal
justice system’s role in protecting society as well as the impact that
legislation creating mandatory-minimum sentences had on criminal
justice expenditures.55 Governments found their alternative in a
range of legal loopholes designed to avoid the constitutional
prohibition on incarcerating individuals for debt,56 by imposing a
range of fees, costs, and surcharges on those who “used” the criminal
justice system.57 States alternatively label these fees as user,
supervision, or pay-to-stay fees, contending that those who “use” the
court’s time, are supervised by court agencies, or are housed in jails
should “pay” for the service.58 Fees are charged for telephone calls,
electronic monitoring, drug testing, probation supervision,
expungement, and various other services.59 Since 2010, forty-eight

53. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, ISSUE BRIEF FINES, FEES, AND BAIL:
PAYMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONALLY IMPACT THE
POOR 2 (2015) [hereinafter COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS], https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brief.pdf.
54. See id. (finding that expenditures were at $157 billion in 1973 and $273
billion in 2012. The expenditure growth was documented at 69% at the state level and
61% at the local level).
55. See CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 11–14. Thus, the city
leaders’ similar argument to the Department of Justice was also neither novel nor
unexpected.
56. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (holding that an individual may
not be imprisoned solely because of a lack of resources to pay a court-ordered sanction
and confirming the holdings of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) and Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971)).
57. See ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CRIMINAL JUSTICE
DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 17 (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/2019-08/Report_Criminal-Justice-Debt-%20A-Barrier-Reentry.pdf.
Studies consistently show that the majority of individuals charged with offenses in
state courts qualify for public defender services because they cannot afford to hire a
lawyer. The result is that a high percentage of the fees that are charged—80–90%
according to one study—are charged to those who meet the state’s indigency
standards. See id. at 4.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 8.
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states have increased the fees assessed on defendants,60 resulting in
a staggering amount of debt—more than fifty billion dollars owed by
approximately ten million people who “used” the criminal justice
system.61
In addition to being predictable, the unconstitutional court system
that the Department of Justice encountered in Ferguson was likewise
neither novel nor random. For decades, organizations as diverse as
the Conference of State Court Administrators and the American Civil
Liberties Union had warned that the respect and integrity of the
criminal justice system was diminished by the practice of primarily
funding the system off the backs of the poor.62 As early as 1986, the
Conference of State Court Administrators (COSCA) adopted
standards warning states against relying on court costs, fines, and
fees as a funding mechanism for courts.63 In its 2010–2011 policy
paper entitled Courts are not Revenue Centers, COSCA included as a
first principle that “[c]ourts should be substantially funded from
general government revenue sources, enabling them to fulfill their
constitutional mandates.”64
60. See KARIN D. MARTIN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., SHACKLED TO DEBT:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE BARRIERS TO RE-ENTRY THEY
CREATE 5 (2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249976.pdf. Similarly, while
twenty-six of the states charged fees for probation and parole supervision in 1990, that
number has now increased to forty-four. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 53,
at 3.
61. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 5. See generally Rakesh Kochhar &
Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End of
Great Recession, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/ (describing the racial disparity
within wealth inequality since the end of the Great Recession).
62. See CARL REYNOLDS & JEFF HALL, CONF. OF STATE CT. ADM’RS, COURTS ARE
NOT REVENUE CENTERS 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter COSCA 2011], https://cosca.ncsc.org/
__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/23446/courtsarenotrevenuecenters-final.pdf; AM. C.L.
UNION, IN FOR A PENNY, THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 8 (2010),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/InForAPenny_web.pdf. For a
general discussion of how fairness impacts an institution’s legitimacy, see Tom R.
Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST.
283, 283 (2003) (noting that the “key factor shaping public behavior is the fairness of
the processes legal authorities use when dealing with members of the public”). See
generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND THE COURTS (2002).
63. See COSCA 2011, supra note 62, at 1.
64. Id. at 7. In that same report, COSCA quoted a decision of the Texas Supreme
Court that “[i]f the right to obtain justice freely is to be a meaningful guarantee, it
must preclude the legislature from raising general welfare through charges assessed
to those who would utilize our courts.” Id. at 1 (quoting LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d
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COSCA’s concerns were driven by studies of state criminal justice
systems undertaken years before the Department of Justice’s study of
the practices in the town of Ferguson. Despite the differences in time
and place, the studies had remarkably similar findings and reached
similarly disturbing conclusions. In 2010, studies of five
geographically and racially diverse states led to a conclusion that the
“new push for revenue has also undermined the integrity of the court
system.”65 The “new push” referenced was the increase in criminal
justice expenditures; the undermining of integrity was the conflict of
interest that arose when courts depended on fees and costs to fund
their operations.
The courts’ newfound vigor in assessing and collecting [legal
financial obligations] has done more than just tarnish their reputation
and integrity. It has created a two-tiered system of justice in which
the poorest defendants are punished more harshly than those with
means. Although courts attempt to collect [legal financial obligations]
from indigent and affluent defendants alike, those who can afford to
pay their legal debts avoid jail, complete their sentences, and can
move on with their lives. Those unable to pay end up incarcerated or
under continued court supervision. Perversely, they also often end up
paying much more in fines and fees than defendants who can pay.
Poor defendants who are re-arrested and incarcerated for failing to
pay face added costs, such as warrant fees, as well as booking and jail
“pay-to-stay” fees.66
Five years after the COSCA study, a larger study involving fifteen
states, exposed the connection between a court’s over-reliance on fees
and costs and a defendant’s’ difficulty in reentering society as a
productive citizen following conviction.67 Once again, the resulting
harm to the justice system was underscored: “Overdependence on fee
revenue compromises the traditional functions of courts and
correctional agencies. When courts are pressured to act, in essence, as

335, 341 (Tex. 1986)). COSCA has continued to propose policy reform, more recently
in a 2015–2016 Policy Paper in which the organization calls for states to end debtors’
prisons and asserts that “[s]tate and [l]ocal [l]egislative [b]odies [h]ave [m]ultiplied
[f]ees as a [s]ubstitute for [a]dequately [f]unding [c]ourts[.]” ARTHUR W. PEPIN, CONF.
OF STATE CT. ADM’RS, THE END OF DEBTORS’ PRISONS: EFFECTIVE COURT POLICIES
FOR SUCCESSFUL COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS 6 (2016),
https://cosca.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/26330/end-of-debtors-prisons2016.pdf.
65. AM. C.L. UNION, supra note 62, at 9.
66. Id. at 10.
67. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 57, at 13.
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collection arms of the state, their traditional independence suffers.”68
Even more fundamental to the court’s integrity is the simple fact
that when courts are funded by fines, fees, and costs assessed against
only those who are found guilty, there is, as Justice Taft noted in
Tumey v. Ohio, an “interest in reaching a conclusion against [the
accused] in his case.”69 Entangling the administrative function of
funding the courts with the judicial function of adjudicating cases
based on the proof creates a financial incentive to convict, a
temptation to disturb the balance in order to convict so as to impose
the fines, fees, and costs. The conflict of interest that results when the
judicial officer undertakes to both produce revenue and accomplish
justice robs the court system of its fundamental core—judicial
independence.
Moreover, this lack of independence on the part of the courts spills
over into other actors in the criminal justice system. As was true in
Ferguson, so too is it that across the country, fee-generating practices
incentivize not only the judiciary, but also law enforcement and the
prosecution who must rigorously charge and prosecute70 in order to
begin the cycle of revenue production; the supervising agencies who
must supervise and monitor; and the clerks of the court who must
collect. The interrelationship creates a “vicious cycle, where courts,
jails, probation agencies, and others whose budgets draw from these
revenue streams worry about the consequences of reducing the flow of
court-generated revenue.”71
Not only has the systemic taint been recognized by organizations
all along the political spectrum, it has also resulted in far-reaching
edicts from courts and judicial leaders. After appointing a National
Task Force on Fines, Fees, and Bail (Task Force) in 2016,72 the

68. Id. at 2. To quote a Michigan judge, “there are days I feel like a tax collector.”
Elizabeth Hines, Views from the Michigan Bench, in TRENDS IN STATE COURTS, supra
note 1, at 35.
69. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
70. Given that the vast majority of cases are plea-bargained, a decision to charge
is in essence a decision to sentence, yet such decisions are not subject to the same
conflict-of-interest standards as judges. We argue that they should be.
71. CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 2.
72. The Task Force was created “to develop recommendations and tools to
promote the fair and efficient enforcement of the law; to ensure no person is denied
access to the justice system based on lack of economic resources; and to develop policies
relating to legal financial obligations that promote access, fairness, and transparency.”
See NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACS., PRINCIPLES ON FINES, FEES,
AND BAIL PRACTICES 1 (2019), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/
14195/principles-1-17-19.pdf.
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Conference of Chief Justices73 (COCJ) and COSCA endorsed
principles developed by the Task Force, including the propositions
that court should be “entirely and sufficiently funded from general
government revenue sources” and not supported by “revenues
generated by [l]egal financial obligations.”74 Courts may not be
“established to be a revenue-generating arm of any branch of
government—executive, legislative, or judicial.”75
At the same time the COCJ and COSCA were ratifying principles
that called for the removal of courts from the business of generating
revenue, individual judges were analyzing whether court systems
funded by fines, fees, and costs violated fundamental principles of due
process and stripped the courts of their essential quality of
independence. In cases brought throughout the country, advocates are
challenging court financing schemes and the conflict of interest that
exists when a court that adjudicates guilt or innocence is funded by
those who are found guilty. In Doraville, Georgia, for example, a city
with fewer than 8,500 residents, plaintiffs allege that city officials
budgeted for 17%–30% of the city’s revenue to be produced by fines
and fees generated by law enforcement and city code enforcers.76 A
2018 lawsuit, filed in the Northern District of Georgia, alleged that
the city’s reliance on fines and fees to fund government operations
incentivized police officers to ticket and prosecutors and judges to
convict, creating a “systemic policy, practice, and custom” of “taking
actions in order to meet that budgeted amount” in violation of due
process.77 In denying the government’s motion to dismiss, the district
judge rejected the notion that “executive-judicial commingling is
categorically required” before an unconstitutional conflict of interest
could be found.78
All else being equal, imagine that direct evidence comes to light
that one of Doraville's municipal court judges is, in fact, finding
citizens guilty for violating city ordinances, even where proof of
73. The COCJ is comprised of the chief judicial officer in each of the fifty states,
the District of Columbia, and several US territories. See CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTS.,
https://ccj.ncsc.org (last visited Sept. 6, 2021). It functions as a partner with the
National Center for State Courts. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., Associations &
Partners, https://www.ncsc.org/about-us/associations-and-partners (last visited Sept.
6, 2021).
74. NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACS., supra note 72, at 2–3.
75. Id. at 2.
76. Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 7, 10–11, Brucker
v. City of Doraville, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (No. 1:18-CV-02375-RWS).
77. Id. at 28.
78. Brucker, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 1213.
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culpability is lacking, solely to increase revenue for the city. “In that
event, could it be said that the tribunal is ‘impartial and
disinterested,’ even though the judge has neither a ‘direct pecuniary
interest in the outcome’ of cases, nor executive responsibilities? Surely
not.”79
In addition to suits that challenge the means by which court
systems were funded, lawsuits challenge a range of specific penalties,
fees, and practices. In many jurisdictions, statutes that suspend the
driving privileges of those who are unable to pay fines, fees, and costs
are being challenged.80 Other lawsuits question the practice—and
absurdity—of repeatedly fining individuals for municipal code
violations for the purpose of generating operating capital for the
courts. Some examples of these code provisions are laws that fine
individuals who have “mismatched curtains,” “doors without screens,”
and “dead vegetation.”81 When the conditions persist, additional fines
are levied for the same condition, even when the property owner does
not have the means to remedy the condition. The costs increase each
month that the fine goes unpaid.82
The use of aggressive enforcement practices, such as
impoundment or forfeiture, is also being tested. In Chicago, for
example, a lawsuit challenging the city’s practice of impounding and
selling illegally parked automobiles when the owners cannot pay the
parking ticket, tow charge, and storage fees resulted in a $4.95 million

79. Id. (quoting Marshall v. Jerricho, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243 (1980); Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)).
80. Two suits challenged these statutes that provided for license suspension in
Tennessee. The first, Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 475, 593–94 (M.D. Tenn.
2018), challenged a statute that mandated the suspension of driving privileges of
indigent defendants who, for a period of a year or more, failed to pay their fines and
costs arising from criminal convictions. The second case, Robinson v. Purkey, 326
F.R.D. 105, 116 (M.D. Tenn. 2018), challenged a similar statute that authorized,
rather than mandated, suspension, but that applied to those who failed to pay fines
and costs attributable to traffic offenses. The United States District Court granted
summary judgment to plaintiffs in the first case and awarded a preliminary injunction
in the second case. In May 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed the grant of injunctive relief, based primarily on a previous ruling in
a Michigan case, holding that a rational basis supported Tennessee policy permitting
suspension of driving privileges for nonpayment of fees arising from traffic violations.
Robinson v. Long, No. 18-6121, 2020 WL 2551889, at *6 (6th Cir. May 20, 2020)
(quoting Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247, 261–63 (6th Cir. 2019)).
81. See, e.g., Civil Rights Class Action Complaint at 5–6, White v. City of
Pagedale, No. 15-cv-1655 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 10, 2016).
82. See, e.g., Lippman v. City of Oakland, 229 Cal. Rptr. 3d 206, 209 (Ct. App.
2017).
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settlement and a reform of the city’s impoundment policy.83 Forfeiture
practices—forfeiting and selling citizens’ property and then
depositing most of the proceeds into the police and prosecutor’s
accounts—have been declared unconstitutional in South Carolina,
where, for example, an investigation revealed that between 2014 and
2016, agencies had seized $17.6 million dollars in citizen assets, 40%
being forfeited from individuals who were not convicted of a crime.84
Propelled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Timbs v. Indiana,85
similar practices are being challenged in lawsuits in New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Michigan.
2. Considering Institutional and Social Costs
More and more courts are recognizing—and we agree—that when
a court system is funded largely through fines, fees, costs, and
forfeitures, an institutional conflict of interest develops that offends
due process, diminishes the court’s integrity, and undermines its
ability to be, and be perceived as, fair and impartial. And, while it
might be easy to discount the negative perceptions of those caught up
in the system, even those who are not overwhelmingly disfavor a
system that punishes people for their inability to pay a debt.86 “When
states and localities use courts to fill gaps in their budgets, this leads
to perverse incentives and erodes public trust in the judicial
system.”87 To assure that courts’ wish to retain their institutional
legitimacy, these conflicts of interest must not go unchecked.
It is easy to see how those trapped in the system would view the
83. See Heather Cherone, Aldermen Greenlight Plan to Pay $4.95M to Settle
Lawsuit Over CPD Impound Program, WTTW (July 20, 2020, 4:23 PM),
https://news.wttw.com/2020/07/20/aldermen-greenlight-plan-pay-495m-settlelawsuit-over-cpd-impound-program. On July 20, 2020, the Chicago City Council
settled the lawsuit and reformed the impoundment policy. Id.
84. See Order, County of Horry v. Twenty Thousand Seven Hundred and
Seventy-One and 00/100 Dollars, No. 2017-CP-26-07411, 4–5 (S.C. Ct. C.P., Aug. 28,
2019),
https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Horry/PublicIndex/PIImageDisplay.aspx?
ctagency=26002&doctype=D&docid=1567016063507-983&HKey=84109575354847
9851061046898114108101112100109121567497728510276103971189883435767995
6547352996611785.
85. 139 S. Ct. 682, 691 (2019) (holding that the excessive fines clause of the
Eighth Amendment applies to the states, and thus to in rem civil forfeiture
proceedings).
86. In a 2016 survey conducted by the National Center for State Courts, 70% of
those surveyed expressed discontent with a system that jailed individuals who could
not pay debt. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., THE STATE OF STATE COURTS POLL 6 (2016),
https://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctcomm/id/164.
87. CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 1.
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system as fundamentally unfair. To those facing fines and fees they
cannot possibly pay, the system is unfair because it ignores their
economic situation. The system continues to punish them despite
their inability to pay, and to some extent, perversely, punishes them
more severely because of their inability to pay. Counter to all
legitimate goals of punishment, the system punishes seemingly for
punishment’s sake with the only goal being to raise money to benefit
the system. To those caught up in the system, it must seem that they
are being punished for being poor. After all, they are forced to choose
between paying the court, or paying for rent, buying food, or having
electricity.
The working poor, like Ti, who face a loss of their driving
privileges for failure to pay traffic fines and court costs, must risk
imprisonment in driving to work in order to receive a paycheck. The
impact extends beyond the individuals, to their families and their
communities. Though perhaps not in the forefront, these human and
societal costs are real.
The question, then, is whether the institutional, human, and
societal costs are sufficiently offset by the benefits provided to the
courts? Do the benefits make the costs tolerable? To the extent we
know the answer, it seems to be “no.” The debt collection system used
by courts is largely ineffective. While states can point to the potential
for an influx of capital by focusing on the amount of debt owed,88 the
reality is that most of the debt is neither collected89 nor collectable.90
Studies show that “[f]ees and other criminal justice debt are typically
levied on a population uniquely unable to make payments.”91 The
nature of the offenses themselves is more likely to ensnare the poor.
Once a fine is imposed, the poor are less likely to be able to challenge
the charge or pay the fine. The amount owed then escalates, with latefees, court costs, and surcharges, putting the individual in a
downward economic spiral that can have a range of debilitating

88. One study has suggested that more than $50 billion in criminal justice debt
is owed by 10 million people. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 5.
89. The few states that have studied their collection rates have found collection
to be very low. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 53, at 5 (stating that rates
of 14, 17, 0, and 20% were found in Florida, Maryland, and Washington, respectively).
90. A 2017 study indicates that more than half of Americans could not afford a
$500 unexpected expense. See Nearly 60% of Americans Can’t Afford Common
Unexpected Expenses 1, BANKRATE (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.bankrate.com/
pdfs/pr/20170112-January-Money-Pulse.pdf.
91. BANNON ET AL., supra note 57, at 4.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4040335

2021]

THE NEW DUE PROCESS

1043

collateral consequences.92
In addition, most states fail to consider the fiscal costs of
collection. While states often delegate collection to private agencies,
they fail to monitor the costs-to-collection ratio, making it impossible
to determine whether they, in fact, collect more than they spend.93
When states ignore the institutional, social, and fiscal costs of a
court system funded by debt collection, they are misled into believing
that the system works and, consequently, less inclined to admit its
failings, even those that strike at the heart of the court system’s
function.
Simply put, court systems that are funded primarily by fines, fees,
and costs cannot fulfill their promise of providing fundamental
fairness and equal justice. It is now abundantly clear that these
systems disproportionately impact the poor and discriminate against
people of color who, in addition to being more likely to suffer poverty,
are also more likely to experience over-policing and uneven law
enforcement.94 As the 2016 Confronting Criminal Justice Debt study
explained, “[p]oor people pay more” because they are poor.95
Excessive fees and fines needlessly enmesh poor people in the
criminal justice system by spawning arrests, court proceedings,
periods of incarceration, and other modes of supervision for those who
lack the ability to pay. Criminal justice debt also contributes to mass
incarceration by destabilizing people living at the economic margins
and by impeding reentry of formerly incarcerated people who face
impossible economic burdens, leading to cycles of poverty and
imprisonment.96
And, as noted, the impact of criminal justice debt extends beyond

92. An individual with criminal justice debt may have limited employment
options and may suffer a denial of food stamps, public housing, and social security
benefits. See CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 15.
93. See id. at 2–3 (citing BANNON ET AL., supra note 57, at 11) (finding that none
of the fifteen states surveyed monitored fiscal costs of collection).
94. For example, in 2014, the year Michael Brown was killed, the National
Center for Law and Economic Justice reported that “[n]on-Hispanic Whites make up
61.8% of population, but only 42% of people in poverty. More than 26% of Black people
and nearly 24% of Hispanic people were in poverty in 2014. In comparison, 10% of
Non-Hispanic Whites and 12% of Asians were in poverty.” NAT’L CTR. FOR L. & ECON.
JUST., POVERTY STATISTICS 2 (2014), https://nclej.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
2014PovertyStats.pdf. See generally Kopf, supra note 9 (examining nationwide census
data and finding that “[t]he best indicator that a government will levy an excessive
amount of fines is if its citizens are Black.”).
95. CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 15.
96. Id. at 1.
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the debtor to the family and community,97 raising unemployment
rates, increasing homelessness, and, potentially, encouraging
criminal behavior.
In addition to criminalizing poverty, systems funded by criminal
justice debt also tend to criminalize race. The disproportionate
concentration in communities of color result not only in an increase in
incarceration rates for African Americans but also in a communitywide increase in the racial wealth gap.98
Can a system so dependent on its “users” for revenue possibly be
fair and impartial enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause? We argue that it
cannot, and there is considerable support for our position, both in logic
and in the case law.
3. Due Process
“No man,” states a venerable common law rule, “should be a judge
in his own case.”99 The impartiality properly demanded of a judge is
not possible when the judge has a stake in the outcome of the
adjudication. According to the United States Supreme Court, this
principle is “a mainstay of our system of government.”100
For this reason, the law has long required that judges not be
parties to the cases they oversee, or closely related to parties in the
case, or subject to rewards or penalties based on the outcome of the
case.101 There can be no due process when the one passing judgment
97. See Schwartztol, supra note 1, at 16 (citing MITALI NAGRECHA & MARY
FAINSOD KATZENSTIEN WITH ESTELLE DAVIS, CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS., FIRST PERSON
ACCOUNTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS, FINING THE FAMILY 3
(2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/communityalternatives/criminal_justice_
debt.pdf).
98. See id. at 17.
99. The principle “nemo iudex in sua causa” dates back as far as the Justinian
Code, FRED H. BLUME, ANNOTATED JUSTINIAN CODE 3.5.1 (Timothy Kearly ed., 2d ed.
2008).
100. Guiterrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 428 (1995). The principle’s
common law history includes the famous Dr. Bonham’s Case, in which it was ruled
that a college of physicians empowered by statute to punish unlicensed medical
practitioners could not serve as “judges, ministers, and parties” all at once. (1610) 77
Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (KB).
101. A case that illustrates the breadth of interest that corrodes due process is
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986). Although the case arose in the
context of judicial disqualification, its holding confirms the general principle that those
with a stake in the outcome of a case should not participate in its resolution. In Lavoie,
the Alabama Supreme Court issued an unsigned per curiam opinion holding that
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is predisposed to judge in favor of one side.
These rules held well enough until recently, but we believe that it
is time to take a broader look at what constitutes impartiality, and
due process, in a judicial (and law enforcement) system that
increasingly depends on fines, fees, and forfeitures not simply as
punishments, but as major sources of operational funds. Inspired by
two recent decisions from the United States Court of Appeals, we
argue that when everyone participating in the justice system is aware
that the system itself depends on sufficient revenue from fines, fees,
and forfeitures, that very dependency is a conflict of interest sufficient
to violate due process rights. In light of the extent to which the modern
judicial system—and, indeed, the entire law enforcement apparatus—
depends upon extracting money from a steady stream of individuals
who appear before it, creating an untenable vested interest in
charging and collecting fines and fees, the result is a fundamentally
unfair system. At a time when funding, and defunding, law
enforcement is the subject of much debate, it is worth considering the
incentives that some sorts of funding can create.
4. Adjudication and Conflicts of Interest
Two classic Supreme Court cases, Tumey v. Ohio102 and Ward v.
Monroeville,103 explain the relationship between conflicts of interest
and due process rights in the context of adjudication. In Tumey, an
Ohio statute allowed village mayors to sit as judges in criminal cases
involving possession of illegal alcoholic beverages.104 Fines awarded
in such cases were to be split among the arresting officers, the
prosecuting attorney, and the mayor, with 50% going to the village
treasury.105 This division of funds was, according to the Supreme
Court, for the “purpose of stimulating the activities of the village
partial payment by an insurance company did not bar bad-faith suits or punitive
damages. Among those joining the majority was Justice Embry, who previously had
filed both an individual action and a class action against insurance companies, raising
similar issues. When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the Court
held that “Justice Embry's opinion for the Alabama Supreme Court had the clear and
immediate effect of enhancing both the legal status and the settlement value of his
own case.” Thus, Justice Embry’s interest in the outcome of the case was “direct,
personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary,” and he acted as “a judge in his own case.” Id.
at 824 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 523 (1927)).
102. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
103. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
104. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 516–17.
105. Id. at 517–19.
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officers to such due enforcement.”106
The financial scheme was the source of some controversy in the
village, and its retention was based on budgetary considerations.107
The sums involved were nontrivial for the place and time and revenue
was distributed between the state and the village including in a socalled “secret service fund,” from which the prosecutor, marshals,
inspectors, and other employees received payment for services
connected to the prosecution.108 The mayor-judge received a salary
supplement from the cases designated as “his fees and costs.”109
Per Chief Justice Taft, the Court opined that this system violated
due process:
[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment and
deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process
of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment
of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him in his case.
The mayor of the village of North College Hill, Ohio,
has a direct personal pecuniary interest in
convicting the defendant who came before him for
trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which
he would not have received if the defendant had been
acquitted. This was not exceptional but was the
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 521.
Id.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 521.
Between May 11, 1923, and December 31, 1923, the total amount of
fines for violation of the prohibition law collected by this village
court was upwards of $20,000, from which the state received
$8,992.50, North College Hill received $4,471.25 for its general
uses, $2,697.25 was placed to the credit of the village safety fund,
and the balance was put in the secret service fund. Out of this, the
person acting as prosecutor in the liquor court received in that
period $1,796.50; the deputy marshals, inspectors and other
employees, including the detectives, received $2,697.75; and
$438.50 was paid for costs in transporting prisoners, serving writs
and other services in connection with the trial of these cases. Mayor
Pugh received $696.35 from these liquor cases during that period as
his fees and costs, in addition to his regular salary.

Id. at 521–22.
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result of the normal operation of the law and the
ordinance.110
Although Tumey is generally viewed as illustrating the mayor’s
personal pecuniary conflict of interest, the underlying rationale of the
decision is that the mayor is part of an entire system that has a
financial incentive to convict, as the Court was careful to spell out:
But the pecuniary interest of the mayor in the result of
his judgment is not the only reason for holding that due
process of law is denied to the defendant here. The
statutes were drawn to stimulate small municipalities,
in the country part of counties in which there are large
cities, to organize and maintain courts to try persons
accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere
in the county. The inducement is offered of dividing
between the state and the village the large fines
provided by the law for its violations. The trial is to be
had before a mayor without a jury, without opportunity
for retrial, and with a review confined to questions of
law presented by a bill of exceptions, with no
opportunity by the reviewing court to set aside the
judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it should
appear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to
indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by
the trial court. It specifically authorizes the village to
employ detectives, deputy marshals, and other
assistants to detect crime of this kind all over the
county, and to bring offenders before the mayor's court,
and it offers to the village council and its officers a
means of substantially adding to the income of the
village to relieve it from further taxation. The mayor is
the chief executive of the village. He supervises all the
other executive officers. He is charged with the
business of looking after the finances of the village. It
appears from the evidence in this case, and would be
plain if the evidence did not show it, that the law is
calculated to awaken the interest of all those in the
village charged with the responsibility of raising the
public money and expending it, in the pecuniarily
110.

Id. at 523.
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successful conduct of such a court. The mayor
represents the village and cannot escape his
representative capacity. On the other hand, he is given
the judicial duty, first, of determining whether the
defendant is guilty at all; and, second, having found his
guilt, to measure his punishment between $100 as a
minimum and $1,000 as a maximum for first offenses,
and $300 as a minimum and $2,000 as a maximum for
second offenses. With his interest as mayor in the
financial condition of the village and his responsibility
therefor, might not a defendant with reason say that
he feared he could not get a fair trial or a fair sentence
from one who would have so strong a motive to help his
village by conviction and a heavy fine? The old English
cases cited above in the days of Coke and Holt and
Mansfield are not nearly so strong. A situation in
which an official perforce occupies two practically and
seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the
other judicial, necessarily involves a lack of due
process of law in the trial of defendants charged with
crimes before him.111
Thus, the mayor was disqualified as a judge for two reasons:
“which existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the
outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate
the fine to help the financial needs of the village.”112 And there is more
than a whiff of suspicion in the opinion regarding the financial
incentives provided to other players, and in fact to the entire justice
system, to pursue conviction for purely financial reasons.113
In the later case of Ward v. Village of Monroeville, the Court
applied the Tumey principle to the situation in another Ohio village,
where the mayor was not directly compensated from the revenue
generated by the fines.114 Although the mayor’s financial interest was
not direct and immediate, the Court held, it was still substantial
enough to make his participation in adjudication a violation of due
111. Id. at 532–34 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 535.
113. In referencing the Tumey decision 90 years later, the Supreme Court noted
that the “Court was thus concerned with more than the traditional common-law
prohibition on direct pecuniary interest. It was also concerned with a more general
concept of interests that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality.” Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 878 (2009).
114. 409 U.S. 57, 58 (1972).
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process.115 How substantial was the mayor’s financial interest? The
Court noted that it was quite substantial indeed: A “major part of
village income is derived from the fines, forfeitures, costs and fees
imposed” by the Mayor’s Court.116 In 1964, this income amounted to
$23,589.50 against total village revenues of $46,355.38—more than
half.117 In other years it was similarly substantial.118 The Court noted
that the revenue from the Mayor’s Court was so substantial that when
it was threatened by legislative change, the village hired a
management consultant for advice on how to deal with the
shortfall.119
Quoting Tumey, the Court reasoned:
The fact that the mayor there shared directly in the
fees and costs did not define the limits of the principle.
Although "the mere union of the executive power and
the judicial power in him cannot be said to violate due
process of law," . . . the test is whether the mayor's
situation is one "which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the
burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice,
clear and true between the State and the accused . . . ."
Plainly that "possible temptation" may also exist when
the mayor's executive responsibilities for village
finances may make him partisan to maintain the high
level of contribution from the mayor's court. This, too,
is a "situation in which an official perforce occupies two
practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one
partisan and the other judicial, [and] necessarily
involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of
defendants charged with crimes before him."120
The conflict of interest that offends due process can be systemic,
not simply individual.121 In Gibson v. Berryhill,122 the Supreme Court
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 60 (citations omitted).
121. In fact, the origins of the principle can be traced to a case involving systemic
conflicts of interest. See cases cited supra note 100, 101.
122. 411 U.S. 564, 578 (1973).
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found due process violated by a conflict of interest on the part of the
Alabama Board of Optometry. Members of the Board were all
optometrists in private practice, and were sitting in judgment of
competing optometrists employed by corporate optometry businesses,
which the Board was explicitly trying to drive out of business.123
Noting that the district court had found that “success in the Board’s
efforts would possibly redound to the personal benefit of members of
the Board,” the Court upheld its finding that the Board’s conflict of
interest disqualified the Board from resolving the matter.124
Thus, whether an apparent conflict of interest is sufficient to
violate due process is determined by an objective view of the
circumstances. It does not turn on whether an actual financial benefit
is obtained; nor does it depend upon the actual subjective intent of the
adjudicator. Accordingly, most recently, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., the Supreme Court applied a due process analysis in a case
in which a party to litigation had been instrumental in financing a
West Virginia judge’s election. Holding that the Due Process Clause
required judicial recusal, despite the absence of proof of actual bias or
direct economic benefit, the Court further solidified that due process
must be “implemented” by an objective standard, not one requiring
proof of “actual bias.”125 An objective standard is appropriate because
of the complexity of ascertaining subjective intent and the difficulty
of reviewing an adjudicator’s claimed intent. But by far, the most
compelling rationale for the objective standard is one that the Court
has recognized consistently: “to perform its highest function in the
best way, ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’”126
Most recently, two decisions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, decided by two separate panels within a week of each
other, have underscored the risks involved in running a judicial
system on revenue from fines and fees. Both had to do with the
“Judicial Expense Fund,” (JEF) a fund administered by New Orleans
judges that depended on revenues collected from fines, fees, and a
percentage of bail bonds. In both cases, the Fifth Circuit found a
conflict of interest sufficient to violate due process rights, even though
the judges involved did not profit directly, because the money involved
123. Id. at 571.
124. Id. at 578.
125. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 878–80 (2009) (citing Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465–66
(1971); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986)); see also Penny J. White,
Relinquished Responsibilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 120 (2009) (discussing Caperton and
judicial conflicts of interest).
126. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (citations omitted).
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redounded to the benefit of judges and the judicial system that they
administered.
Money from the Judicial Expense Fund was used to pay for:
[S]alaries and related-employment benefits (excluding
the judges), CLE travel, legislative expenses,
conferences and legal education, ceremonies, office
supplies, cleaning supplies, law books, bottled water,
jury expenses, telephone, postage, pest control, dues
and subscriptions, paper supplies, advertising,
building maintenance and repairs, cleaning services,
capital outlay, equipment maintenance and repairs,
lease payments, equipment rentals, professional and
contractual expenses, the drug testing supplies, coffee,
transcripts, insurance, and miscellaneous.127
Though the fund could not be used to augment judicial salaries, it
could be used to pay the salaries of other court personnel, and to cover
professional liability insurance. Each judge was allocated $250,000
from the fund to cover personnel salaries, and $1,000 for court
expenses.128
The two cases challenged different aspects of revenue collection as
creating a conflict of interest. In Cain v. White, the plaintiffs
challenged the funding of the JEF from fines and fees that are set by
judges, arguing that judges would be encouraged by the funding to
assess more and higher fines and fees than otherwise. 129 Writing that
“the issue here is whether the Judges’ administrative supervision over
the JEF while simultaneously overseeing the collection of fines and
fees making up a substantial portion of the JEF, crosses the
constitutional line,” the Fifth Circuit held that it did.130
Even though no money wound up directly in the judges’ pockets,
the JEF had the effect of making their lives easier, and insufficient
funding in the JEF had the effect of making their lives harder:
When collection of the fines and fees is reduced, the
OPCDC can have a difficult time meeting its
operational needs, leading to cuts in services,
reduction of staff salaries, and leaving some positions
127.
128.
129.
130.

Cain v. White, 937 F.3d 446, 448–49 (5th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 451.
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unfilled. During these times, the Judges have
attempted to increase their collection efforts and have
also requested assistance from other sources of funding
including the City of New Orleans.131
The judges argued that they were highly resistant to temptation.
Rather than a standard involving conflicts that would potentially
tempt the average man, they argued for one that recognized their
greater moral fiber: “Essentially, the Judges argue that an average
man might be swayed by the institutional interest at play here, but
not an average judge.”132 The court was unimpressed: “The caselaw
simply does not support such a distinction.”133
On examining the record, the Fifth Circuit found a situation much
like that in Ward v. Monroeville:
The district court very thoroughly examined the ways
in which the judges have an institutional interest in
the JEF. It observed that the ‘[f]ines and fees revenue
goes into the Judicial Expense Fund,’ over which ‘the
Judges exercise total control.’ It noted that while the
money does not support the Judges’ personal salaries,
it largely goes to support the salaries of each Judges’
staff. In addition, the district court noted that while
some of the money collected from fees is earmarked for
specific purposes, the revenue all goes to the JEF and
makes up approximately one-fourth of the OPCDC’s
budget.134
Like the mayor of Monroeville, the court found, the judges were
too dependent on the revenue to support the operation they
administered not to be influenced by funding. The test employed was
not a bright-line test based on specific roles, but rather a “totality of
the circumstances” test:
131. Id. at 449.
132. Id. at 451.
133. Id. The Fifth Circuit’s analysis is consistent with that of Justice Kennedy in
his thoughtful discussion of the evaluation of judicial bias in Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 882–84 (2009) (“The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias,
and the fact that the inquiry is often a private one, simply underscore the need for
objective rules. Otherwise there may be no adequate protection against a judge who
simply misreads or misapprehends
the real motives at work in deciding the case.”)
134. Cain, 937 F.3d at 454 (citations omitted).
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We agree with the district court that the situation here
falls within the ambit of Ward. In doing so, we
emphasize it is the totality of this situation, not any
individual piece, that leads us to this conclusion. In
sum, when everything involved in this case is put
together, the “temptation” is too great.135
Similarly, in Caliste v. Cantrell, another panel of the Fifth Circuit
decided another challenge to the Judicial Expense Fund, in this case
to its funding via a levy on commercial bail bonds.136 Under Louisiana
law, when a defendant secures a commercial bond to guarantee his or
her presence at trial—which “[j]ust about every defendant” does, “as
that requires paying only a fraction of the bond amount,”—1.8% of the
bond’s value is deposited in the JEF. 137 The problem with that,
according to plaintiffs:
When a defendant has to buy a commercial surety
bond, a portion of the bond’s value goes to a fund for
judges’ expenses. So the more often the magistrate
requires a secured money bond as a condition of
release, the more money the court has to cover
expenses. And the magistrate is a member of the
committee that allocates those funds.138
Noting that “the mere threat of impartiality” violated due
process139, the court found such a threat in this case. The magistrate
was in the same situation, again, as the mayor of Monroeville:
Because he must manage his chambers to perform the
judicial tasks the voters elected him to do, Judge
Cantrell has a direct and personal interest in the fiscal
health of the public institution that benefits from the
fees his court generates and that he also helps allocate.
And the bond fees impact the bottom line of the court
to a similar degree that the fines did in Ward, where
they were 37–51% of the town’s budget. The 20–25% of
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 454 (footnote omitted).
Caliste v. Cantrell, 937 F.3d 525 (5th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 526.
Id.
Id. at 530.
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the Expense Fund that comes from bond fees is a bit
below that percentage but still sizeable enough that it
makes a meaningful difference in the staffing and
supplies judges receive. The dual role thus may make
the magistrate “partisan to maintain the high level of
contribution” from the bond fees.140
Taken together, these two cases represent a rededication to the
principles of Ward, along with a newfound recognition that the sort of
problems identified there apply in circumstances reaching far beyond
the village courts of Ohio. The violation of due process does not turn
on the nature of any particular structure or financial arrangement,
but rather whether, taken as a whole, the structure of financial
arrangements involved would tempt an average person to lean in the
direction of the state, because the legal machinery would benefit from
the resulting infusion of funds, or suffer from the lack of such an
infusion. This was a problem in the village of Monroeville, and it was
a problem in New Orleans, even though the decisionmaker did not
obtain any direct (or even diffuse and indirect as in Gibson v.
Berryhill) personal financial benefit. What makes this most
significant, as we have demonstrated, is that such institutional
financial incentives now pervade the state judicial and law
enforcement apparatuses.
5. Solutions: Due Process in A Fee-Based State
So far, we have shown the standard for due process in adjudicatory
matters where the adjudicator stands to benefit, institutionally, from
a conviction and resulting penalty and depends, to a significant
degree, on wringing revenue out of defendants and does so in a way
that disproportionately impacts the poorer segments of society.
Because this is the case, and because every state participant in the
system is aware of that dependence to a greater or lesser degree, we
would argue—in fact, we are arguing—that they are all substantially
in the role of the mayor of Monroeville. While the system as it operates
may not directly place money in their pockets, it is nonetheless the
case that their families, their livelihood, and their day-to-day quality
of life are strongly impacted by the system’s extraction of fines, fees,
and forfeiture revenues from the people who come before them. The
system, as an institution, and those who draw paychecks from it, have
140.
(1927).

Id. at 531 (citation omitted) (quoting Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60
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a vested interest in being funded and, as such, are too dependent not
to be influenced.
So, what solutions do we propose? There are several, on scales
both large and small. On the smallest scale, courts—especially
reviewing appellate courts—need to be more willing to police
excessive fines, which are explicitly prohibited by both the United
States Constitution and forty-nine of fifty state constitutions.141 In
doing so, it’s important to remember that fines that don’t seem
excessive to middle and upper-middle-class lawyers and judges with
money in the bank can be financially disastrous, or simply unpayable,
to many poverty-stricken defendants. The lower the ceiling on
acceptable financial penalties, the less temptation on judges to levy
those penalties out of conscious or unconscious institutional concerns.
Many of our reform suggestions require only that judges return to
the business of judging. By this we mean that judges must undertake
an inquiry that is consistent with the essential promises of due
process.142 In considering whether to impose a penalty, judges must
evaluate both the private and governmental interests at play,
applying the fundamental factors test recognized more than fifty
years ago in Mathews w. Eldridge and Goldberg v. Kelly.143
First, judges must evaluate whether a fine is a meaningful
punishment alternative in the case. An individual should not be fined,
simply because the offense provides for a fine. Rather, courts should
undertake to determine whether a fine is the appropriate punishment
in the case, given the nature of the offense and the nature of the
offender. But that is only the first consideration. If a fine is
appropriate, the judge must also determine what amount is
appropriate, resisting the urge to simplify into a “one fine fits all”
system of punishment.144 In determining both whether to impose a
141. The exception is Illinois, whose state constitution lacks such a clause. See
generally ILL. CONST.
142. For more than a century, the Supreme Court has recognized that due process
incorporates the right to a meaningful hearing in advance of deprivation of a property
interest. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he right to be heard before being condemned
to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and
hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.”); Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123–25, (1889).
143. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 267–68 (1970).
144. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
The State, of course, has a fundamental interest in appropriately

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4040335

1056

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[88.1025

fine and what fine is appropriate, courts must consider an individual’s
ability to pay. In evaluating this factor, courts may be aided by
guidelines adopted and enforced by state supreme courts, but courts
must remember their obligations to make these determinations on the
record after a hearing during which the individual’s ability to pay is
meaningfully considered.
Almost always, courts will benefit by appointing counsel to
represent the individual at the hearing at which the ability to pay is
considered.
Once a court determines that an individual is able to pay and the
amount of the payment, the court, or trained court staff, should
determine the method of payment. When the facts support it, an
individual should be allowed a reasonable interest-free, penalty-free
payment plan. Likewise, when a determination is made that the
individual is unable to pay, courts should be open to alternative
methods of punishment, including community service, but not
incarceration. When court-ordered fines and fees have not been paid,
courts must monitor the mechanisms used to enforce payment.
Individuals who have not paid should not be subject to arrest. As is
true of most sentencing decisions, the court’s determination should be
subject to appellate review.
Courts must also monitor other actors in the system, supervising
prosecutors much more closely where financial temptations exist.
Were a citizen to offer a prosecutor $10,000 to prosecute an enemy, we
would not hesitate to call that a bribe illegitimating the prosecutor’s
decision to do so. When, instead, that prosecution results in fines, fees,
or forfeitures bringing $10,000 into the prosecutor’s office, perhaps
some similar degree of skepticism is justified. This is particularly true
since, as mentioned before, the prevalence of plea-bargaining, and the
often steep penalties, in terms of increased charges, laid on
defendants who refuse a plea deal, means that the decision to charge
a defendant, and the offering and acceptance of plea bargains, are

punishing persons—rich and poor—who violate its criminal laws. A
defendant's poverty in no way immunizes him from punishment.
Thus, when determining initially whether the State's penological
interests require imposition of a term of imprisonment, the
sentencing court can consider the entire background of the
defendant, including his employment history and financial
resources.
Id. at 669–70 (citations omitted).
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often, effectively, adjudicatory processes themselves.145 Closer judicial
supervision of plea deals, especially those that produce revenue for
the prosecution or for the law enforcement agencies it is intertwined
with might help, but there remains the problem that the supervising
judges also know, at some level, that the entire system depends on
such revenues.
At the largest scale, the solution becomes simpler: Courts must be
fully funded from state revenues, not from court-produced fines and
fees. We must simply require that all revenues from fines, fees, and
forfeitures be deposited in the state’s general fund, rather than
remaining at the disposal of the system that has responsibility for
prosecuting and adjudicating those accused of crimes. To the objection
that this would leave the legal system underfunded, we have two
answers: First, to the extent that is true, it is an admission that we
are right about the corrupting potential of such funding mechanisms,
and second, that traditionally in our democracy, voters and taxpayers
get to decide how well-funded various government functions should be
through the mechanism of legislative appropriations. Bypassing the
appropriations process by letting the criminal justice system “selffund” with money taken from defendants is, in this sense, undemocratic.
Our earlier suggestions could, in principle, be instituted by courts,
even trial courts, themselves. Requiring that income from judicial
proceedings must be deposited in the state’s general fund rather than
redounding to the profit of courts and law enforcement could be
instituted either legislatively or judicially. In practice, a legislative
solution seems unlikely given the realities of state politics. But given
that prosecutions and adjudications by courts and institutions
possessing a financial incentive to find defendants guilty are, as we
have explained, unconstitutional, such a solution could be, and should
be, imposed by appellate courts in the states, and even in the United
States Supreme Court.
Could courts legitimately require that money from fines, fees, and
forfeitures be deposited in the general fund—or, to phrase it
differently, that all revenues in support of law enforcement and the
judiciary come from the general fund? Absolutely, given that due
process demands it. And there is precedent for just that sort of
145. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When
Everything Is A Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102 (2013) (explaining that the
most significant part of the criminal justice process, decisions on charging and plea
bargains, are largely exempt from due process review and grant prosecutors enormous
discretionary power).
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approach, though in a different constitutional context.
In the celebrated dormant commerce clause case of West Lynn
Creamery v. Healy, the Supreme Court confronted a two-part
Massachusetts scheme that taxed all milk sold in the state, about two
thirds of which was from out-of-state, but that then rebated the
proceeds to Massachusetts dairy farmers. This was an ingenious effort
on Massachusetts’ part, since each half of the scheme, a uniform tax
on the one hand, and a state-funded subsidy on the other, was
permissible under existing commerce clause doctrine.146
But, the Court held, the combination of the two was impermissible
because the effect was indistinguishable from a tariff on out-of-state
milk.147 Furthermore, the usual political checks on taxation were
absent from this scheme:
By conjoining a tax and a subsidy, Massachusetts has
created a program more dangerous to interstate
commerce than either part alone. . . . [W]hen a
nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one
of the groups hurt by the tax, a State’s political
processes can no longer be relied upon to prevent
legislative abuse . . . .148
Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred, but argued that the
outcome might be different if the revenues from the tax were paid into
the state’s general fund, rather than reserved for the dairy farmers:
I would therefore allow a State to subsidize its
domestic industry so long as it does so from
nondiscriminatory taxes that go into the State’s
general revenue fund. Perhaps, as some commentators
contend, that line comports with an important
economic reality: A State is less likely to maintain a
subsidy when its citizens perceive that the money (in
the general fund) is available for any number of
competing, non-protectionist purposes.149
Similarly, where money from fines, fees, and forfeitures is paid
into the general fund there is no temptation on the part of law
146.
147.
148.
149.

West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
Id. at 188.
Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 211–12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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enforcement or adjudicators to lean in a particular way so as to
maximize the financial prospects of their own offices or of those they
depend on. (In fact, the legal provisions allowing these agencies to
benefit from their prosecutions, which parallel the financial
incentives to prosecutors and police under the statute at bar in Ward,
are no doubt intended to affect their judgment, as the incentives in
Ward were.) One might characterize the resulting remedy as a
requirement that all such revenues be paid into the general fund, or,
alternatively, as a requirement that the agencies in question be
funded by general revenues. In either case, the incentive to engage in
particular kinds of prosecutions, or to enter into particular kinds of
plea deals, based on revenue is removed.
We said that this remedy is simple, and it is. This is a remedy that
could be imposed judicially, as a matter of due process, or legislatively,
though the former seems more likely than the latter. That said, it is
no less sweeping for its simplicity. Undoing a system of funding that
has taken over much of the criminal justice system is not a small
thing, however simple. The consequences would be substantial, and
courts—who often seem as dedicated to the smooth functioning of the
machinery of government as to abstract concepts of justice—may find
it a hard pill to swallow. But it is necessary medicine. No “justice
system” worthy of the name convicts people simply because it is paid
to do so.
CONCLUSION
We can attempt to staff our law enforcement agencies, our
prosecutors’ offices, and our courts with individuals immune to the
temptations provided by financial structures that reward assessing
financial penalties against citizens. But despite our best efforts, we
will wind up staffing those institutions with human beings, and
human beings, by their nature, are not immune to temptation.150 Put
simply, if we wish for our criminal justice system to do better, we must
stop rewarding it for doing worse.
Although we began this study from rather different political
perspectives, we have reached the same, inescapable conclusion. To
operate as legitimate institutions of government, our courts must be
freed from serving as revenue centers. If courts are to command
respect; if their judgments are to be honored and observed; if, in fact,
the most fundamental guarantee of the Constitution is to be valued,
150. The apostle Paul is credited with saying that “[n]o temptation has overtaken
you that is not common to man.” 1 Corinthians 10:13.
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then our courts must be funded neutrally by state revenue, and not
employed as revenue agencies. We must remove the taint that
adheres when courts depend on fines, fees, and forfeitures to operate,
and we must end the criminalization of poverty. Justice requires it.
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